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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Utah Association for Justice (formerly the "Utah Trial Lawyers Association")
is a statewide organization comprised of attorneys who are committed to protecting the
rights of persons who have been injured in their person or property, and who turn to the
courts for judicial redress. In promoting these interests, the Utah Association for Justice
("UAJ") is particularly committed to ensuring that the judicial system provides fair,
prompt, and efficient administration of justice.
UAJ members represent injured people in the vast majority of personal injury tort
actions in this state. The Court's decision on whether expert reports are required of
treating physicians will impact virtually every one of those actions, as well as all future
personal injury litigation. Thus, the resolution of this case will not only have a
significant impact on the parties to this action, but upon thousands of tort victims
throughout the State of Utah as well.

INTRODUCTION
The issue before the court is whether treating physicians, who have been
designated as expert witnesses pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A) must also submit a
written expert report, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B), even if they were not
specially retained for the purpose of litigation, and do not testify for the party as a regular
part of their employment. This issue of first impression for Utah can best be resolved by
looking to the plain language of the rule itself, which excludes treating physicians and
other non-retained experts from the written report requirement.

iv

Additionally, though an issue of first impression in state court, federal courts have
been struggling with the issue since the amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 in 1993:
When an expert, who will testify, was not hired in anticipation of litigation,
federal courts have split on how the regulations are to be applied. It is
agreed that the party who will call the expert must reveal the latter's
identity, but the issue is whether the expert must file a report even when she
will provide some opinion testimony.
Jack H. Friedenthal, et al.9 Civil Procedure §7.6 at 403 (3d ed. 1999). The "split" in the
federal courts has resulted in two approaches: First, the "status-based" test, based on the
plain language of the rule, considers whether or not the witness was "retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The second is the
"substance-based" approach that requires courts and litigants to go beyond the text of the
rule in an attempt to define the parameters of appropriate testimony. Several key
decisions from courts applying both approaches reveal that the status-based approach is
consistent with the rule's plain language and promotes economy and judicial efficiency as
well.
UAJ contends that Utah should adhere to the general rule of construction and defer
to the rule's plain language to determine its application. In this case, the plain language
of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) excludes treating physicians from the written report requirement.
Additionally, multiple policy factors, including securing "the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination"1 of every action, are promoted by a plain language
interpretation and adherence to the status-based approach.

1

Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a) (2009).
v

ARGUMENT
L

LAW AND POLICY SUPPORT ADHERENCE TO THE "STATUSBASED" APPROACH RATHER THAN ADOPTION OF THE
"SUBSTANCE-BASED" APPROACH.
A.

The Plain Language of Rule 26 Requires a "Status-based"
Approach.

A general rule of construction is when interpreting a rule or statute, courts should
first look to the plain language of the provision. As this Court has explained, "[o]ur
objective in interpreting a court rule is to give effect to the intent of the body that
promulgated it. Thus, we interpret a court rule in accordance with its plain meaning, and
we construe the rule so that it is in harmony with related rules." State v. Rothlisberger,
2006 UT 49,115, 147 P.3d 1176 (footnotes omitted).
The Utah State Constitution empowers the judiciary to "adopt rules of procedure
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state." Utah Const. Art VIII, § 4 (1896).2
Accordingly, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 26, were implemented by
this Court, operating pursuant to its express constitutional authority. By interpreting the
language of Rule 26(a)(3)(B), the Court will explicate the judiciary's intentions for
adoption of the rule. If the Court is convinced that a change is necessary, the proper
course of action is not to adopt an extra-textual interpretation of the existing rule, but

2

See also Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, \ 15 n.3, 133 P.3d 370 (noting that this
section "vests in the Utah Supreme Court both the authority and the duty to 'adopt rules
of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state,"' and that the Legislature
has "only the authority to 'amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.'")

rather, to amend the rule pursuant to Chapter 2, Article 2 of the Utah Judicial Council
Rules of Judicial Administration.
Accordingly, in addressing the issue of whether Rule 26(a)(3)(B) requires treating
physicians to provide written expert reports, it is necessary to examine the text itself. In
this case, the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 26 establishes the Court's intent to
adopt a status-based approach to the rule's expert report requirement. The rule states, in
pertinent part:
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court,
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party.
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) (2009) (emphasis added).
The rule is drafted in an exclusive manner, with language plainly indicating that
written reports are required of some experts, but not others. Specifically, written reports
are only required of witnesses designated as experts pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(A), and
"retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties
as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony." Id.
The plain language of the rule requires consideration of the witness' status, Le.9
whether the witness was "retained or specially employed," but not the substance of the
witness' testimony. Indeed, any consideration of testimonial substance adds extra-textual
2

requirements to the rule. Clearly, according to the rule's plain language, unless a treating
physician has also been "retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony," or
is "an employee of the party" whose employment "regularly involve[s] giving expert
testimony," no written report is required. General rules of construction dictate that the
Court adhere to this status-based approach set forth by the rule's plain language.
Additionally, courts that have deviated from the plain language of similar rules by
adopting a substance-based approach have opened a Pandora's Box of conflicting
policies and decisions, thereby complicating, rather than simplifying, the discovery
process. As the following section shows, adherence to the status-based approach of the
rule's plain language reflects proper judicial construction and sound policy as weH.
B.

Federal Jurisprudence Supports Adherence to the "Statusbased" Approach.

As discussed above, the plain language of Rule 26 requires a status-based
approach to the issue of whether written reports are required of an expert witness.
Because Rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s construction is a matter of first impression, it is also useful to
consider the text and subsequent jurisprudence of its federal counterpart.3 Utah's Rule 26
was adopted in 1999, along with several other substantive changes to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. As reported in the Utah State Bar Journal, "[t]he rules changes were

3

"[S]ince the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, we may look to decisions under the federal rules for guidance."
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f 64, 99 P.3d 801 (citation omitted).
3

originally modeled on the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."4
Cameron S. Denning, Significant Changes to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 Utah
Bar J. 11 (1999). Regarding the changes to Rule 26, "[ejxpert reports are needed only
from retained and testifying experts." Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). This, of course,
was consistent with the federal rule, after which the amended state rule was patterned.
As adopted in 1993, the amended Federal Rule 26 states, in pertinent part:
(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony.
(A) In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party shall
disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial
to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to
provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the
party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written
report prepared and signed by the witness.
Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(2) (1993). Significantly, the advisory committee explicitly
addressed the scope of the rule pertaining to treating physicians:
The requirement of a written report... applies only to those experts who are
retained or specially employed to provide such testimony in the case or
whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve the giving of
such testimony. A treating physician, for example, can be deposed or called
to testify at trial without any requirement for a written report.

4

The only substantial deviation from the text of the federal rule's expert
disclosure requirements was by whom the report was to be signed. The federal rule
requires written expert witness reports to be signed by the witness, Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(B) whereas the Utah Rule permits the report to be signed by ;wthe witness or
party." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B); see also id. Advisory Committee Notes.
4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) Advisory Committee Note (1993) (emphasis added). Clearly
the text of the federal rule—on which Utah's rule is based—as well as the advisory
comments, contemplated a status-based approach that would permit treating physicians to
testify without the onerous requirement of producing a written report.
But in Wreath v. United States, 161 F.R.D. 448 (D. Kan. 1995), one federal district
court inadvertently wrote additional requirements into the rule. In Wreath, the plaintiff
designated her treating physician as an expert who would offer testimony on the "nature,
extent, and cause of her damages." Id. at 449. The defense argued that this triggered
Rule 26(a)(2)(B)'s written report requirement, and moved to compel production of a
report. Id. The court, however, denied the motion, noting that "[e]very witness offering
testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703 and 705 is not 'retained or specially employed to
provide expert testimony.'" Id. at 450.
For some reason, however, the court went further, and created an extra-textual,
substance-based consideration about "the scope of the proposed testimony":
To the extent that the treating physician testifies only as to the care and
treatment of his/her patient, the physician is not to be considered a specially
retained expert notwithstanding that the witness may offer testimony under
Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703 and 705. However, when the physician's proposed
opinion testimony extends beyond the facts made known to him during the
course of care and treatment of the patient and the witness is specially
retained to develop specific opinion testimony, he becomes subject to the
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The determinative issue is the
scope of the proposed testimony.
Id. (emphasis added). As though the newly created, substantive component were not
enough, the court indicated that under the new test, courts would also need to consider
"the witness' complete name, his professional degree, the nature of the injuries for which
5

treatment was provided, [and] the opinion which the witness is expected to proffer" in
determining whether or not written reports were required. See id.
Although the court did not rely on this new test to reach its conclusion in Wreath,
the substance-based approach was "suffered by virtue of judicial inertia to drift upon the
surface currents of federal law." Fireside Bankv. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 98
(Cal. App. 6 Dist. 2005) (discussing a different principle). Since then, federal courts and
litigants have grappled with Rule 26 and the expert report requirement, and not
surprisingly a split of authority has emerged.
The Tenth Circuit, however, has strictly adhered to a plain language construction
of Federal Rule 26. In Watson v. Untied States, 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2007), a
prisoner alleged that the government's neglect of his medical condition resulted in an
incapacitating brain injury. Id. at 1102-03. At trial, the government sought to introduce
expert testimony from the prison's clinical director, but the plaintiff objected that the
director had not submitted a written report. Id. at 1105. The trial court overruled the
objections, and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Quoting Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the court explained, "[wjhile the Rule focuses on those
who must file an expert report, by exclusion it contemplates that some persons are not
required to file reports and that these include individuals who are employed by a party
and do not regularly give expert testimony." Id. at 1107. The court then held that 46the
plain terms of Rule 26 [do] not include a requirement of a report in this case." Id.
Other jurisdictions have, of course, reached different results. For instance, in
Prieto v. Malgor, 361 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit held that an
6

employee expert on a police department's use of force was required to submit a written
expert report, even though he had not been specially retained, nor did he regularly
provide expert testimony as an employee. The court reasoned that given the scope of the
testimony, the witness "functioned exactly as an expert witness normally does," id. at
1319, and a report was therefore required.
As the Federal District Court of Utah subsequently noted, however, Prieto's
holding did not derive from the plain language of Rule 26. In Adams v. Gateway, Inc.,
2006 WL 644848 (D. Utah 2006), the court recognized that "[t]he [Prieto] opinion
therefore held that only percipient experts are excluded from a report requirement,
ignoring the language in the Rule." Id. at *3. Adams, a particularly well-reasoned
decision, rejected the Eleventh Circuit's substance-based approach in favor of a plain
language interpretation of the rule.
In Adams, the defendant moved to compel a written expert witness reportfromthe
plaintiff, who had been designated as an expert on several patent issues. Id. at * 1. "The
question," the court explained, "is whether he is bound by the requirement of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(2)(B) to provide an expert report." Id. The court approached the question by
engaging in a thorough discussion of the rule's history and application, and held that
under the plain language of the rule, the plaintiff had to be designated as a Rule 702
expert (which he was), but he did not need to supply a report. Id.
The court went on, however, and noted that there were "several trial level cases
where the court has simply been unable to live with the language of the Rule." Id. at *3.
It continued:
7

Generally, these cases reject the language of the Rule because 'the reading
proposed . .. would create a distinction seemingly at odds with the evident
purpose of promoting full pre trial disclosure of expert information." These
cases just refuse to recognize "a category of expert trial witness for whom no
written disclosure is required" because they say that result is "not justified by
any articulable policy." But policy should only be used to construe a rule,
not to contravene its language.
Id. (quoting Day v. ConsoL Rail Corp., 1996 WL 257654 at *2 (S.B.N.Y. 1996)). The
court concluded that cases that discard the status-based approach set forth by the rule's
plain language "have unnecessarily stretched to find a reason that the Rule requires a
report." Id.
A survey of cases that have gone beyond the plain language, status-based
approach to adopt a substance approach reveals a complicated, and often inconsistent,
jurisprudential landscape. Some cases, like Prieto, consider what the non-retained expert
will say, while others are concerned with when the opinion was formed. Kg, Mohney v.
U.S.A. Hockey, Inc., 138 Fed. Appx. 804 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that because a treating
physician's opinion was formed after treatment, rather than during, he was required to
provide a written report). Others have held that the rule applies differently to different
kinds of experts. See, e.g., Day v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 1996 WL 257654 (S.D.N. Y.
1996) (finding that non-retained treating physicians may not have to file reports, but nonretained railroad track inspectors do).
The Tenth Circuit and District Court of Utah, however, have avoided such
needless complication by simply adhering to the plain language of the rule and applying
the status-based approach. Although the substance-based approach may have been

8

applied in more reported decisions, trends indicate that its inherent workability is
causing it to be abandoned in favor of the status-based approach. See, e.g., Garcia v. City
of Springfield Police Department, 230 F.R.D. 247 (D. Mass. 2005); Kirkham v. Societe
Air France, 429 F.3d 288 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also generally Andrew W. Jurs, The
Expert Heightened Disclosure Requirement and the Physician-Defendant in Medical
Negligence Cases: Rejecting the Substance-Based Rule 26 Approach, 28 J. Legal Med.
521 (2007). Now that it has been presented with the issue, the Utah Supreme Court
should learn from other courts' mistakes, and adhere to the plain language of the rule. By
doing so, the Court can provide clarification of Rule 26, as well as the Utah Court of
Appeals' decision in Pete v. Youngblood.
C.

Pete v. Youngblood Did Not Adopt a "Substance-based"
Approach to Rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s Written Report Requirement.

Some practitioners and district court judges hold a misperception that Utah has
already adopted the substance-based approach, in Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303,
141 P.3d 629. In that case, however, the Utah Court of Appeals simply held that pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A), the plaintiff was required to identify a treating physician
as an expert witness. Significantly, the court specifically stated that it would unot address
5

It cannot be disputed that there are far more reported decisions applying the
substance-based, rather than status-based, approach. If all of the cases formed a unified,
workable test, it might be construed as evidence of the soundness of that approach. But
in the fifteen years since Wreath, anything but consistency has emerged. The volume of
cases attempting to resolve some application of the substance-based approach simply
illustrates the amount of controversy it generates, and gives an indication of the volume
of additional motion practice involved. The economic and judicial inefficiency of the
substance-based approach are discussed at Section 11(A), below.
9

whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under Rule
26(a)(3)(B). Pete, 2006 UT App at f 11, n.3.
Despite this clear proclamation, the aforementioned misperception persists. Some
courts, including the district court in this matter, have incorrectly relied on Pete to
support a proposition for which the case does not stand. In this case, for instance, the
district court held that "[t]he policy established by the Court of Appeals in the Pete case
is clear; if a medical witness provides testimony that goes beyond mere diagnosis,
treatment, and care of the patient, then that witness becomes a 'retained expert5 for
purposes of Rule 26(a)(3)(A)(B)."6 To understand Pete's holding, as well as discern the
possible source of confusion, it is useful to review the facts of the case.
In Pete, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case designated her treating doctor
as a fact witness, but not as an expert. Id. at t 5. Later, the defendant moved for
summary judgment, and in her opposition, the plaintiff presented an affidavit from her
treating doctor that contained opinions on the applicable standard of care. Id. at f 6. On
the defendant's motion, the trial court struck the affidavit because the treating doctor had
not been designated as an expert. Id.
On appeal, the court of appeals properly considered the substance of the treating
physician's testimony to determine whether it was based solely on his observation, or
whether it contained "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," which would
make him an "expert" under Utah R. Evid. 702. Id. atfflf11-12. Because the treating

6

Minute Entry Re: Defendant's Motion in Limine, dated October 24, 2007 (R.
282-284; 332-334) at 1.
10

doctor's opinions addressed the standard of care, the court concluded that his opinions
were based on "specialized knowledge," and that therefore he should have been
designated as an expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(A). Id. at ^ 14-15. As mentioned
above, the court expressly withheld any opinion on whether Rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s written
report requirement applied. Id. at f 11 n.3.
The district court in this case, as well in other cases pending in the district courts,
have stretched Pete's holding to justify a "policy" that conflates the substantive
consideration required for Rule 26(a)(3)(A)'s disclosure requirements and the written
report requirements of Rule 26(a)(3)(B). Indeed, in this case, the district court referred
to the rule as "26(a)(3)(A)(B)," suggesting that the court did not appreciate the
distinction.
But a reading of the plain language of subsections (A) and (B) reveals that their
requirements are distinct from one another. While some measure of substantive
consideration is necessary to categorize an expert under Rule 26(a)(3)(A), no such
inquiry is necessary under Rule 26(a)(3)(B), which instead focuses solely on whether the
witness has been specially retained or regularly testifies as part of his or her employment.
Any attempt to read Pete v. Youngblood as saying something otherwise is without
merit. Indeed, Pete itself recognizes the distinction. Discussing subsections (A) and (B),
the court observed, "rule 26(a)(3) contemplates that all persons who may provide opinion
testimony based on experience or training will be identified, but that only retained or
specially employed experts are required to also provide an expert report." Id. at f 12
(emphasis added, citations omitted). Relying on Pete to justify a substance-based
11

approach to Rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s report requirement requires a strained reading of the case,
and extra-textual interpretation of the rule. On review, however it is clear that the Utah
Court of Appeals did not adopt a substance-based approach to Rule 26(a)(3)(B) in Pete,
and the Utah Supreme Court should decline to do so in this case.
II.

THE SUBSTANCE-BASED APPROACH IS IMPRACTICAL IN
APPLICATION, AND SHOULD BE REJECTED.
A.

Requiring Reports from Treating Providers Increases the Time,
Expense, and Complexity of Litigation.

As discussed above, the plain language of Rule 26 clearly sets forth a status-based
approach for deciding whether an expert witness must submit a written report. In
addition to being interpreted according to its plain language, Rule 26 should also be
construed "so that it is in harmony with related rules." State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT
49, f 15, 147 P.3d 1176. In this particular case, the Court should consider how Rule 26
relates to Rule 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the rules
should be "liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action."
This consideration is important, for as Justice Powell observed, rules of civil
procedure have "not infrequently [been] exploited to the disadvantage of justice."
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). If the Court adopts
a substance-based approach to Rule 26(a)(B)(3)'s written report requirement, it will be
inviting such exploitation.
The first, most obvious casualty will be the objective of securing an "inexpensive
determination" of actions involving experts. The consequence of requiring treating
12

physicians and other non-retained experts to prepare and submit written reports is that
injured parties, many of whom are already burdened with medical bills, unemployment,
and other economic strains, will be forced to bear the expense. As skilled professionals,
health care providers will require payment for the time it takes to write and review the
reports. The added cost for a physician's time and will raise expenses exponentially.
Furthermore, this additional expense will be virtually unavoidable because the
plain language of the rule gives no guidance for a substance-based approach. Thus,
plaintiffs will be forced to run the risk of speculating on how a trial court might qualify
the substance of a treating doctor's testimony, or be forced to incur the expense and
inconvenience of obtaining written reports as a prophylactic measure in all cases.
The next casualty is "speedy" determination. From a practical standpoint, the
substance-based approach ensures that litigants will file flurries of additional pleadings
concerning the scope and substance of a non-retained expert's testimony. There will be
motions to strike speculatively insufficient designations, and when those have been
resolved, there will be preemptive motions to preclude or limit testimony accordingly.
In deciding these motions, courts will be forced to take preliminary evidence and
consider what a non-retained expert's testimony might include, whether it was formed at
the time of the witness' direct involvement, and whether it crosses some arbitrary line
between direct observation and indirect experience. As an inherently unworkable test,
the substance-based approach would therefore inject additional controversy into complex
cases, all at the expense of judicial economy and efficiency. It would therefore
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undermine, rather than promote, the procedural objective of "securing] the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a).
On the other hand, adherence to the status-based approach set forth by the plain
language of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) simply requires the parties to consider whether the witness
has been specially retained or if his or her employment regularly requires giving expert
testimony. A status-based inquiry resolves the issue with a minimum amount of
controversy, and eliminates the need for superfluous motion practice and the additional
inquiries necessitated by a substance-based determination.
Rule 1(a) is also concerned with the "just" disposition of cases. There are obvious
policy interests that might seem to weigh in favor of extending the report requirement to
treating doctors. For instance, one of Rule 26's objectives is 'to simplify discovery and
promote fiill disclosure of information." Utah R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Note
(1999). Of course, "[o]ne of the primary goals of the discovery process is 'to remove
elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and court can determine the facts and
resolve the issues as directly, fairly, and expeditiously as possible.'" Glacier Land Co.,
LLC v. Claudia Klawe & Associates, LLC, 2006 UT App 516, f 35, 154 PJd 852
(quoting Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967)).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out, however, discovery policies that promote the
"just" determination of civil actions can be served without rewriting Rule 26 by judicial
fiat. In Watson v. United States, 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2007), the court discounted the
argument that not having a report from a non-retained expert disadvantaged the other
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side. It noted that under a plain language application of the status-based approach,
"sandbagging is not necessarily inevitable," id. at 1108, and explained:
Generally all witnesses, regardless of their status, must be identified, with
their contact information, in a party's Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosures.
Moreover, parties must also disclose, inter alia, a copy or location of "all
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that are in
possession, custody, or control of the party and that the disclosing party may
use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment" Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B)
Likewise, all witnesses are subject to deposition,
individual document demands, and other discovery the court deems
necessary and appropriate.
Id.
Legitimate discovery that promotes the "just" determination of civil cases can
therefore be served without the substance-based approach. Additionally, adoption of
such an approach will invariably add expense and complexity to an already expensive,
overburdened civil justice process. The status-based approach is therefore not only
consistent with the plain language of Rule 26(a)(3)(B), but it is also harmonious with the
policies set forth by Rule 1(a). Accordingly, the Court should construe the rule according
to its plain language, and adhere to the status-based approach by holding that reports are
not required for experts who have not been "specially retained" or whose employment
does not "regularly involve giving expert testimony."
B.

Many Utah Doctors have been Directed to Refuse Contact with
Plaintiffs' Lawyers, thus making it Impossible for Represented
Plaintiffs to Obtain Written Reports.

As discussed above, the Court should be mindful of the obstacles imposed by
adding additional expense and delay. The Court can avoid these obstacles by simply
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adhering to the status-based approach to Rule 26(a)(B)(3), which is helpful, because
plaintiffs in Utah are already at a disadvantage when it comes to communicating with
their physicians.
The American Medical Association ("AMA") recognizes that treating physicians
may be called upon to participate in the civil justice system. Article 9.07 of the AMA's
Code of Ethics states, in pertinent part:
In various legal and administrative proceedings, medical evidence is critical.
As citizens and as professionals with specialized knowledge and experience,
physicians have an obligation to assist in the administration of justice.
When a legal claim pertains to a patient the physician has treated, the
physician must hold the patient's medical interests paramount, including the
confidentiality of the patient's health information, unless the physician is
authorized or legally compelled to disclose the information.
Physicians who serve as fact witnesses must deliver honest testimony. This
requires that they engage in continuous self-examination to ensure that their
testimony represents the facts of the case.
(2004).7 Notwithstanding this ethical "obligation to assist in the administration of
justice," the Utah Medical Insurance Association has explicitly instructed Utah doctors to
refuse contact with plaintiffs' lawyers.
As this Court has previously recognized, "[b]y the end of 1983, the Utah Medical
Insurance Association (UMIA), which is owned by Utah physicians," became "Utah's
primary malpractice carrier." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 587 n. 24 (Utah 1993).
Though precise numbers are unavailable, UAJ believes UMIA to represent approximately
eighty percent of the state's physicians. Its influence is therefore substantial. Recently,
7

Available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medicalethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion907.shtml (last accessed June 13, 2009).
16

in a publication directed to Utah physicians, UMIA advised that "[t]he best policy is for a
physician to avoid making statements to a plaintiffs attorney regarding the care and
management of a patient except in a formal meeting with representation from UMIA or
other counsel." Tom Greene, A. Thomas Williams, M.D., Negotiating the Slippery Slope
of Talking with Attorneys About a Patient's Care, (The Exchange, a Publication of the
Utah Medical Insurance Association, Summer 2008)8 at 5.
UMIA went so far as to warn Utah doctors, "it is not unusual for a plaintiffs
attorney to be solicitous when gathering information, and adversarial and aggressive
when it comes down to giving testimony." Id. The article also gives pointed directions
to physicians, including "[d]o not provide any specific information or opinion about the
patient or the care rendered [to the plaintiffs attorney]." Id. at 2.
Unfortunately, many Utah physicians seem to have heeded UMIA's directive than
Article 9.07 of the AMA's Code of Ethics, and refuse contact with plaintiffs' lawyers.
This makes it impossible for patients' legal representatives to discuss care and treatment,
much less solicit the writing of an expert report. This does more than simply present a
minor practical impediment to litigation. Rather, the campaign of UMIA and other health
care administrators who seek to prevent doctors from talking with plaintiffs' lawyers
constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to imposing the written report requirement upon
treating physicians. This is yet another reason the Court should adhere to the statusbased approach, and reject the substance-based approach, to Rule 26(a)(B)(3).

8

Attached hereto as Addendum 1. Also available at http://www.umia.com/
PDFs/EXCHANGE_SpringSummer2008.pdf, last accessed June 13, 2009
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C.

Adopting the "Substance-based" Test for the Treating Physician
in this Case would Needlessly Complicate the Rule's Application
to Other Areas of Specialized Knowledge.

The question in this case is whether treating physicians who have been designated
as experts under Rule 26(a)(3)(A) must also submit written reports under Rule
26(a)(3)(B), at least in some circumstances. Proponents of the substance-based approach
argue that it is a simple consideration of whether the doctors' opinions were formed in
the scope of the doctor's observation and treatment of the patient. The Court must
recognize, however, that Rule 26(a)(3)(B) applies to all expert witnesses, and not just
health care providers. This begs the question: Even if a "scope of observation and
treatment" inquiry would work with treating physicians, what considerations should be
applied for different types of experts?
The substance-based, "scope of observation and treatment" test simply does not
lend itself to other areas of expertise. Consider the facts of State v. Rothlisberger, 2006
UT 49, 147 P.3d 1176. As in Pete v. Youngblood, Rothlisberger addressed the issue of
fact witnesses who possessed specialized skill, training or knowledge, and therefore had
to be designated as experts pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 702. In Rothlisberger, however, it
was a police officer, not a physician, who attempted to offer specialized testimony. The
defendant objected, arguing that such testimony constituted undisclosed expert testimony
Id. at 15. This Court agreed, holding that under Rule 26(a)(3)(A), the officer should
have been designated as a Rule 702 expert. Id. at f 37.
Like Pete, Rothlisberger did not address the written report requirement.
Nevertheless, it provides a useful example. Under a substance-based approach to Rule
18

26(a)(B)(3), what considerations would apply to a police officer with specialized
knowledge of the significance of drug volume? Although such officers may be said to
"observe/9 they generally do not "treat;" thus, the proposed "scope of observation and
treatment" analysis is of no use.
The same concern would apply in a case involving the technical expertise of the
patent holder in Adams v. Gateway, Inc., 2006 WL 644848 (D. Utah 2006). Any
arbitrary line drawn to determine the scope of a treating physician's observation and
treatment would not assist a court in determining whether the patent holder's technical
expertise required him to prepare a written report. For that matter, what about
accountants, engineers, lawyers, physicists, or anyone who may be both a percipient fact
witness and possess "[scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge?"
Surely the Appellant does not contend that Rule 26(a)(B)(3) should apply one way
for medical experts, and another way for all other areas of expertise. Adopting the
substance-based approach for a general requires that some extra-textual test be devised to
uniformly apply to all possible areas of expertise. The federal courts that have attempted
to fashion such an approach have met with no success, and the jurisprudence has suffered
for it. Imposing the substance-based test on physicians in this case would establish
precedent requiring lower courts to attempt to adapt the "scope of observation and
treatment" analysis for every conceivable area of expertise to determine whether the
"substance" somehow requires them to submit a written report. The resulting
controversies would be counterproductive and inefficient.
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In contrast, simply following the status-based approach set forth by the rule's plain
language requires only a single, straightforward inquiry: Was the expert "retained or
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case," or do his or her "duties as an
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony?" If so, then a written
report is required. If not, then no report is necessary. By adhering to the status-based
approach, the Court not only upholds the general rule of plain language interpretation, but
provides functional direction for all cases involving questions under Rule 26(a)(3)(B).

CONCLUSION
The Court should construe Rule 26(a)(B)(3) by its plain language, and adhere to
the rule's status-based test. If a treating physician has not been retained for the purpose
of litigation, then no written expert report should be required. This approach is based not
only on a plain language analysis, but also on strong policy and recognition of the
practical impediments created by the alternative, substance-based approach.
Dated this 15th day of June, 2009.
JSOCIATION FO$ JUSTICE

RYAN M. SPRINGER
Attorney fo\ Amicus Curiae Utah Association
for Justice \
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Tom Greene, A. Thomas Williams, M.D., Negotiating the Slippery Slope of
Talking with Attorneys About a Patient's Care, (The Exchange, a Publication of
the Utah Medical Insurance Association, Summer 2008).

Negotiating the Slippery Slope of Talking with
Attorneys About a Patient's Care

T
f;m Cntnt
UMIA Senior Claims Investigator
A Thomas Williams MD
Assistant Medical Director UMIA

AT SOME POINT DURING A PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE, there is a

high probability that he or she will be engaged by a plaintiff's
attorney to discuss the care of a patient either as a potential
expert or as a subsequent treating physician These conversations—always a slippery slope for well-intentioned and ethical
physicians—just became more treacherous due to the February
ruling by the Utah Supreme Court (Sorensen v Barbuto, 2008
UT,Feb 1,2008)
In Sorensen v Barbuto the Court ruled that a plaintiff's
physician (treating or subsequent treating M D s) may not
engage in any discussions with defense counsel without prior
notification being given to the plaintiff In this case, the plaintiff filed a negligence action against a vehicle driver for damages sustained in an accident During discovery, the plaintiff's
physician participated in an ex parte (one-sided, no plaintiff
counsel present) communication with defense counsel As a
lesult, he agreed to act as an expert witness for the defense
Following trial for the negligence action, the plaintiff filed
various claims against the physician for the ex parte communication The physician filed a motion to dismiss the suit,
which the Court of Appeals granted The Utah Supreme Court
reversed the ruling judging that even when a patient puts his/
her medical condition at issue in litigation, the patient can still
prevent the physician from communicating with defense counsel unless specific permission is granted or representation is
present The Supreme Court seems to believe that private, onesided (ex parte) conversations with a defense attorney de'pnve
the plaintiff of a just opportunity to secure potential supportive witnesses and experts from among treating physicians if the
plaintiff is not represented or a party to the conversations

W h a t does this mean for
UMIA-insured physicians?
If you are approached by a lawyer to discuss your role in
a patient's care, the following steps are the recommended
method of engaging the inquiring attorney
1 Identify who the attorney represents, plaintiff or
defense, and get the attorney's name and phone
number
2 Do not provide any specific information or opinion
about the patient or the care rendered
3 Indicate any further communication can be gladly
accomplished once you make arrangements for
counsel to be present

2

4 Notify a UMIA claims investigator by phone of the
tequest to meet the attorney An investigator is always
available
5 Resist any temptation or the seduction of a casual
request by an attorney to discuss care or opinions over
the phone or in person without appropriate legal
representation
6 Understand that even if a patient has authorized his/
her attorney to speak with you ex-parte, you are not
compelled to do so without your own attorney present

UMIA claims investigators will arrange, at no expense to the
physician, for expert legal representation to be present for any
required communications with the requesting attorney. To be in
compliance with the above ruling, the plaintiff needs to be notified if the meeting is requested by defense counsel. If a meeting is
planned with the plaintiff's attorney, it is important that the discussion be well documented to avoid embarrassing contradictions
in testimony that can occur with informal, friendly conservations.

patient without appropriate legal support. First, you can be in
violation of the above ruling, which could result in a secondary
claim against you by the involved patient (plaintiff). Second, any
information collected at an informal and casual meeting with
a plaintiff's lawyer could result in your becoming an additional
named physician in the suit. Third, it is possible any conversation
you have could be taped by an attorney without your knowledge.
Any statements you make may be used to contradict subsequent
testimony and invalidate you as a witness to the detriment of you
and any defendants.

What happens if you talk to lawyers about a
patient's care without counsel present?

The Bottom Line

Several unfortunate and embarrassing events can occur if a physician opts to engage in conversations with an attorney about a

The following examples of physician interactions with attorneys
point out the common pitfalls awaiting the unwary physician.

What happens next?

Examples
Here are two real examples o f the kinds o f

dant physician on causation and long-term prognosis.

problems physicians created for themselves

When the plaintiff's attorney began questioning Dr. A,

by talking to plaintiff's counsel without
proper representation and knowledge o f
the potential pitfalls. (Names and details

he revealed for the first time he had spoken to Dr. A the
week before. He then proceeded to question Dr. A in
a very accusatory way suggesting that he agreed with
the plaintiff's expert report in their meeting just a week

have been changed to protect the privacy

before. He emphasized Dr. A's testimony with quotes

o f the involved parties).

from his written notes made during the earlier conversation. As one might imagine, Dr. A clearly experienced sig-

Example 1: The Experience of Dr. A and His
Recorded Conversation

attorney used Dr. A's words to refute his own testimony.

Dr. A acted as subsequent treating physician for a

The context of the questions ended up being very dif-

patient who filed a liability claim against a UMIA insured

ferent during the deposition than in the earlier informal

physician. The UMIA attorney scheduled the deposition

discussion with the plaintiff's attorney when he seemed

of Dr. A to obtain his opinion about the cause and the

to only be seeking clarification. Defense counsel could

nificant discomfort and embarrassment as the plaintiff's

permanency of the damage to the patient. No negli-

not re-establish Dr. A's credibility and Dr. A went from

gence claim existed against Dr. A.

being helpful to the defense to a discredited witness for

One week prior to the deposition, the plaintiff's
attorney met with Dr. A at his office to "run a few things

both sides because of conflicting statements that were
now permanently recorded in deposition record.

by him" before the scheduled deposition. The plaintiff's

Dr. A did not inform anyone o f his meeting with the

attorney nicely and congenially asked Dr. A to comment

plaintiff's attorney, including the institutional risk man-

on the issues discussed in a report from an out-of-state

ager. Had he mentioned his planned meeting with the

expert for the plaintiff, which he did.

plaintiff's attorney to a risk manager or to UMIA staff,

At the scheduled deposition requested by the defen-

he would have been advised that it might not be in his

dant physician's attorney, Dr. A provided testimony that

best interest to discuss the case informally as anything

proved to be very supportive and helpful to the defen-

said could be used against him in his formal deposition.
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Examples... continued from

p.3

and indicated he may have made some statements

Example 2: The Friendly Neighborhood
Attorney

during his first conversation with the attorney that

Dr. J, a pathologist and UMIA insured, examined an

UMIA retained counsel to attend the deposition with

he might not be able to support during a deposition.

intra-operative, fragmented, frozen section during

Dr. J, and counsel wisely demanded, and received, a

the course of routine work and determined it to be

copy of the transcript o f the taped phone conversa-

free of malignant change. A subsequent review of the

tion prior to the deposition. Needless to say, the

permanent tissue sections, and confirmation by a

relationship between the attorney and the patholo-

gynecologic pathologist, revealed a very rare form o f

gist cooled significantly because the attorney did not

cancer. The final pathology report reflected the

inform him he recorded the call until two days prior

nature o f the malignancy and its likely size as

to the deposition.

indicated by measurement o f the fragmented sample

At deposition, the relationship between Dr. J

aggregate. The report did not indicate a volume

and the plaintiff's attorney remained tense and

estimate because of the fragmented and limited

adversarial. The plaintiff's attorney tried to hold Dr.

nature o f the specimen.

J to his statements from the taped transcript even

The patient asserted a negligence claim against

though they would likely not be admissible in court

the operating surgeon for failure to pre-operatively

and were objected to on the record. Dr. J confirmed

anticipate the presence of the malignant tumor

that the measurements noted in the report repre-

based on the pathologic report of the estimated

sented the combined diameter o f the entire tissue

tumor size. The claim did not include the patholo-

sample and not the measurement o f the cancerous

gist.

tissue. He tried to explain this point in the initial

The plaintiff's attorney knew the pathologist

phone conversation, but it had been overlooked in

socially from the neighborhood, and Dr. J considered

the plaintiff's interpretation of his comments. The

this attorney to be a friend. The attorney

transcript showed Dr. J to be very distracted during

approached Dr. J and inquired about whether he had

the call as one of his children had been involved in

any slides from the case from which he could

an accident, and he had to deal with that issue in the

estimate the quantitative size of the tumor in

middle of the conversation about the tumor with the

centimeters. The pathology report indicated the

attorney.

mass approximated 10 cm. Dr. J indicated he could

Dr. J. clearly believed the plaintiff's attorney

not put a determinate measurement on the sample

used his personal relationship with him to try to

because o f fragmentation, but agreed it likely

elicit statements that did not accurately reflect the

approached a 5 cm size.

facts of the case. Fortunately, the duplicitous action

Several months later, the pathologist received a

o f the plaintiff's attorney to elicit favorable, but inac-

subpoena to give his deposition in the claim. The

curate statements from Dr. J was thwarted by the

plaintiff's attorney again phoned the pathologist to

support and guidance of UMIA counsel. Dr. J's

review what he would say in the deposition, and for

statements during the deposition remained consis-

the first time, informed Dr. J he had taped their prior

tent with the phone transcript in spite of the plaintiff

phone conversation.

attorney's attempt at misinterpretation.

Concerned, Dr. J contacted UMIA for assistance

From The President and CEO
Negotiating the Slippery Slope...

Martin J. Oslowsh
President and CEO, UMIA

continued from p. 3

The best policy is for a physician to avoid making
statements to a plaintiff's attorney regarding the
care and management of a patient except in a formal
meeting with representation from UMIA or other
counsel and only after careful, complete review of the
records. Plaintiff's attorneys may record anything you
say without revealing they are doing so, particularly in

Anythingyou

say in these

casual conversations may
make it very difficult
to give proper, accurate
testimony at deposition;
the information could be
used against you should an
error or lapse on your part
be discovered.
phone conversations. Anything you say in these casual
conversations may make it very difficult to give proper,
accurate testimony at deposition; the information
could be used against you should an error or lapse on
your part be discovered. Conversations with defense
attorneys without plaintiff approval may result in
secondary action against the physician.
Although generalizations are to be avoided, it is
not unusual for a plaintiff's attorney to be solicitous
when gathering information, and adversarial and
aggressive when it comes down to giving testimony.
Be especially wary of casual "friends" who are attorneys that just want a "curbside opinion," or want to
"run something by you" regarding a specific patient or
medical condition. It is best to follow the above recommendations for any conversations with attorneys that
are not your own. d
If you have questions about the Sorenson ruling or how to
deal with providing information to inquiring attorneys, please
contact Jen James at the UMIA at 801.531.0375.

Software Conversion Successful
2007 was our first full year of operation utilizing the Delphi Technology Oasis Software. The 2008 renewals were processed with
the new software. As with any data conversion, problems plagued
us throughout the year, and in several instances, data conversion
errors affected the accuracy of some renewals. These errors are being
addressed and corrected as they are discovered. If you have been
affected by any of these problems, we appreciate your understanding and patience. We have always prided ourselves on outstanding
customer service, which we pledge to continue to provide to you, our
policyholders.
This spring, several advancements enhanced our information
technology capabilities, which allow us to continue to improve our
service. These improvements included a software upgrade to the
Oasis system and the addition of several new, faster, and bigger
servers. Because of our increasing IT demands, the IT department
was reorganized. In the near future, we will also be implementing a
Disaster Recovery Strategy.
Our plan to go "paperless" was accelerated in conjunction with
the move to the new office location and the conversion of our software. Since spring 2007, three million images have been scanned into
the system including all claim files and underwriting files. We are
now operating in a "paperless environment." As documents arrive in
the office, they are prepped and then scanned into Imageright, our
document management sofware. Email communications contain- ,
ing important information are copied directly into Imageright. The
benefits of this conversion include the elimination of rental costs for
storage of paper files and immediate electronic access to underwriting and claim information via computer terminals. Multiple people
can view a document at the same time. The system incorporates protection from accidental deletion and loss of data. Once a document
is scanned it cannot be deleted or altered.

We need your email address!
In order to complete our conversion to a paperless enterprise, we
need your email address! It is the desire of the UMIA to communicate with policyholders about Exchange operations, elections, and
other matters via electronic newsletter. Not only will electronic communication save operational costs, time, and resources, it also allows
us to provide you with information in real time. For these reasons,
please complete the postage-paid card contained in this newsletter
and return it to UMIA. Future Exchange newsletters, notices, and
risk management information will be sent electronically via email.
If you wish to receive this information via hard copy, please let us
know. Your email address will be kept strictly confidential, d
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